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Abstract: If a computer node is infected by a virus, worm or a backdoor,
then this is a security risk for the complete network structure where the node is
associated. Existing Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) provide a cer-
tain amount of support for the identification of such infected nodes but suffer from
the need of plenty of communication and computational power. In this article, we
present a novel approach called AGNOSCO to support the identification of infected
nodes through the usage of artificial ant colonies. It is shown that AGNOSCO over-
comes the communication and computational power problem while identifying in-
fected nodes properly.
Keywords: Network Protection, Intrusion Detection, Bio-inspired Computing,
Ant Colonies.
1 Motivation
In the current working and life environment, connected nodes - computers, servers,
etc. - are essential. These nodes are under constant assault form attacks like e.g.
worms, trojans, and hackers. Nowadays, there exist several approaches to protect
a computer node or a network against criminal attacks like virus- and malware
guards, symbolic NIDS-solutions like SNORT [9, 2, 10], and bio-inspired NIDS-
solutions (Artificial Immune Systems, [6, 7, 11]). These protection-systems check
each packet, which traverses a network node, and evaluate if this packet intends to
attack or not. However, many NIDS solutions suffer from identifying (new) attacks
as well as from the need of plenty of computational power; furthermore, there exist
applied techniques to camouflage attacks in a way that NIDS are not able to identify
the attack at all. Hence, there are situations when an attack infects a node and when
a computer network risks to be infected by the node. This is much more critical as
it seems since infections can cause a backdoor to other attacks, infections can send
packets containing an attack to infect healthy nodes.
The identification of such an infected node - sometimes also zombie-node
called - is a well-know problem. In the current research community, only a few
approaches of identifying infected nodes are known, for example
• Anomaly Detection: A system knows how to identify normal network traffic
and tries to identify abnormal network traffic using this information. A node,
which transmits a lot of abnormal traffic, is infected with a high probability.
• Statistically Analysis of Network Traffic: A system observes the network
traffic and if some statistically parameters are met, the node is probably in-
fected.
• Inference from Network Traffic Analysis: If a network node is infected, the
network node releases several packets containing an attack in order to infect
also other nodes of the network. This behaviour can be recognized using
intrusion detection and an intelligent inference system is used in order to
derive to the infected node.
• Trust or the Byzantine General Problem [8]: If a node runs a service, a
watchdog can use this service regularly in order to check for incorrect an-
swers and the watchdog can observe if the node sends packets if it should
not in order to detect abnormal behaviour.
Unfortunately, all these approaches have significant disadvantages. First, they
need information from the computer network that must be collected, fusioned, and
further processed. Consequently, this results in high communication costs where
the centric evaluation affords plenty of computational power. Second, the last ap-
proach shares several other disadvantages, e.g., defining an incorrect answer and
deciding when a node should not send any packets. Following this, our motivation
is that novel (bio-inspired) systems can significantly contribute to a higher identi-
fication rate of infected nodes.
2 Description of the idea
In this article, we introduce a novel approach called AGNOSCO that is an acronym
for AGents for the ideNtification of infected nOdes uSing artificial ant COlonies.
The advantages of AGNOSCO are that it works autonomously, distributed and more
efficiently. AGNOSCO does not need either much additional computational power
or much additional communicative time while identifying infected nodes properly.
AGNOSCO is a part of our implemented network intrusion detection system
called SANA (= Security anAlysis in iNternet trAffic), which is an artificial im-
mune system that uses lightweight, autonomous and adaptive artificial cells for the
protection of networks. SANA is a library of non-standard approaches for network
security and compounds these approaches in an artificial immune system.
To understand AGNOSCO, we shortly have to introduce the concept of ant
colonies. Generally, ants have two states and if an ant carries out a prey, the ant will
release a lot of pheromones while traveling back to the ant-hill. This is, because
other ants should find this prey as well. However, if an ant does not carry out a
prey, it releases only a few or no pheromones. If now an ant navigates, it uses the
pheromones determined on the ground. In this respect, ant colonies are used for a
lot of computer science problems, e.g. optimization [4, 1, 3].
For AGNOSCO, each connection of the network contains a pheromone-value
that is increased if an packet with attack travels over the connection; it is decreased,
if a packet without attack travels over the connection. The pheromone value is cal-
culated by the application of an affinity-function. This pheromone-value represents
the rate of attacked packets over the connection. AGNOSCO flows through the
network, interprets the pheromone value and identifies the infected nodes. There-
after, a disinfecting-process can be started for this infected node; this disinfection-
process is not part of AGNOSCO which just identifies the infected nodes.
3 Implementation Details
So far, AGNOSCO is implemented in SANA as one of the lightweighted, adap-
tive and autonomous artificial Cells that flow through the network to protect the
computer network. In SANA, there exist artificial Cells and other components
that evaluate packets whether they contain an attack or not [5]. Furthermore,
if a packet arrives at the destination, the node confirms this event using a small
confirmation-packet which is sent from the destination to the source. If an artificial
Cell or another component identifies a packet as malicious, the node will send a
confirmation-packet as well. However, this confirmation-packet does not inform
the source, it increases the pheromone-level on each connection on its way back to
the source-node. The confirmation-packet for a packet without an attack behaves
like an ant without a prey and the confirmation-packet for a packet with an attack
behaves like an ant carrying out a prey.
For setting the right value of pheromones, the following affinity-function a f is
chosen:
a fconnection =
b
∑
i=1
inc∗dec#good-packetsi ( f oreach connection in the network)
where b is the number of infected (bad) packets over this connection and
the parameter inc the increasing-factor of the system. The parameter dec is the
decreasing-factor of the system and #good-packetsi the number of good packets
which travelled over the connection after the i-th bad packet. In this test simula-
tion, we adjusted inc to the value of 20 and dec permanently to 0.95.
Then, the workflow of the affinity-function is as follows:
• If a packet contains no attack travels over a connection, all #good-packetsi
are increased by 1 because #good-packetsi is the counter how many good
packets travelled over the connection after the i-th bad packet.
• If a packet contains an attack travels over a connection, a new summand is
added to the sum. Hence, the parameter b is increased by 1 and #good-packetsb
- the counter of good packets of the new bad packet - is set to 0.
Consequently, this affinity-function for a connection increases heavily if a bad-
packet is found and decreases slightly if a good packet travels over the connection.
We refer for an analysis of this function to the section 5.
If a node is infected, it will normally send a high number of packets containing
the attack in order to infect other nodes in the computer network. Therefore, there
will originate pheromone-tracks in the system which point towards the infected
nodes; as already mentioned before, AGNOSCO identifies the infected nodes.
AGNOSCO evaluates the pheromone-level of connections as an artificial cells
of the artificial immune system SANA while flowing through the computer net-
work: if a pheromone-level is higher than the threshold of AGNOSCO, it follows
the track. However, if AGNOSCO follows a track and no connection in a node has
a pheromone-value higher than the threshold of AGNOSCO, AGNOSCO stops and
ends the track. So, AGNOSCO knows that this node is infected - if and only if
the parameters of AGNOSCO are set properly; it then informs other components
of SANA for disinfection or isolation of this node. AGNOSCO behaves like an ant
which leaves the ant hill and tries to find a prey using the pheromones. Conse-
quently, the system simulates an artificial ant colony where the preys are infected
nodes.
Summary of the Changes in the Network:
In the Network Infrastructure must be for each connection some storage-space
added in order to store the pheromone-value, at most 10kB per connection. The
Network Protocols must not be changed and AGNOSCO is compatible with ex-
isting protocols. Essentially, the NIDS-Behaviour concerning identified malicious
packets must be changed; if the NIDS identifies a packet as malicious, addition-
ally it must send a confirmation-packet for this bad-packet in order to update the
pheromone-values on the path from source to destination.
4 Simulation Results
Using the implementation of AGNOSCO/SANA for the identification of infected
nodes, we tested several scenarios, where different types of attacks have infected
network nodes. In all scenarios, AGNOSCO tried to identify the infected nodes
in order to start the disinfection. Generally, AGNOSCO identified all infected
nodes efficiently and produced a good performance for different attack types. Ad-
ditionally, we determined an appropriate parameter setting. For example, a sce-
nario with 75 nodes and 3 artificial Cells of type, AGNOSCO took about 30-50
processing-steps to identify all infected nodes. If a new infection of a node occured,
AGNOSCO identified this infected node using at most 20 processing time-steps.
In the simulation, we found out a certain amount of computational power and
the communication bandwidth that is requested by AGNOSCO. The computational
power is nearly not recognisable since AGNOSCO flows through the network and
reads and rates just the pheromones values. For the storing of the pheromone-
value in each connection, only storage-space was needed that is limited to 10kB.
The communication bandwidth depended on how many artificial Cells of this type
are flowing through the network. A simulation of 75 nodes and 3 artificial Cells
of type AGNOSCO requested only little storage and one or two IP-Packets per
time-step. Consequently, hardware requirements can be met by standard computer
networks while additional communication does not matter in common used high-
speed networks.
5 A closer look to the Affinity-Function
The affinity-function is biologically inspired. In human affinity-functions, an event
increases the affinity heavily and, over time if no new event occurs, the value of the
affinity-function decreases primarily heavily and afterwards slowly. This means,
that the gradient of the function is primarily high and decreases afterwards. Thus,
the human body reacts using the affinity-function to an event heavily; thereafter,
with the high gradient, the human body tries to compensate an error; and after-
wards, with the low gradient, it tries to reach a stable value.
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Fig. 1: A short-term plot of the affinity-
function used in our simulations.
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Fig. 2: A long-term plot of the affinity-
function used in our simulations.
Consequently, the affinity-function tries to model the behaviour that the value
increases by leaps and bounds in order to mark if in a short time-step a lot of bad
packets are found for a connection. On the other hand, the affinity-function tries
primarily to decrease the value fast in order to eliminate a possible error. After-
wards, the affinity-function value decrease slowly in order to reach a stable value
so that pheromone-tracks appear in the network. The affinity-function forgets also
old events of bad-packets in order to model the behaviour of the human affinity-
function and in order to reach a stable value.
Figure 1 visualizes a short-term plot of the affinity-function. The parameters
are inc = 20, dec = 0.95 and the number of packets is 100 and the packets number
3, 10 and 15 are identified as bad and all other packets are good.
Figure 2 visualises the long-term behaviour of the affinity-function if an in-
fected node is nearby the connection. Every fifth packet is an identified bad-packet
and all other packets are good. The parameters inc = 20 and dec = 0.95 are equal
to the last plot of the affinity-function. The figure shows that the value of the
affinity-function straight fast towards a stable value and the value alternates around
it.
With this affinity-function, the pheromone-tracks appear in the network prop-
erly and the artificial Cells can follow these tracks as well as identify the infected
nodes; in our simulations the threshold of AGNOSCO was 10.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we described a novel approach called AGNOSCO for the identifica-
tion of infected nodes in a computer network. The idea is biologically inspired and
follows the behaviour of ant colonies. AGNOSCO is implemented, simulated and
tested; AGNOSCO efficiently identifies the infected network nodes unless taking
both additional computational power and additional communication bandwidth.
We are sure that AGNOSCO can enhance commonly used NIDS as well as SANA.
Future enhancements of SANA especially the communication and collaboration of
the artificial Cells in SANA will be our next challenges.
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